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 How do we come to know metaphysical truths? How does metaphysical 
inquiry work? Are metaphysical debates substantial? These are the 
questions which characterize metametaphysics. This book, the fi rst 
systematic student introduction dedicated to metametaphysics, discusses 
the nature of metaphysics – its methodology, epistemology, ontology, 
and our access to metaphysical knowledge. It provides students with a 
fi rm grounding in the basics of metametaphysics, covering a broad range 
of topics in metaontology such as existence, quantifi cation, ontological 
commitment, and ontological realism. Contemporary views are discussed 
along with those of Quine, Carnap, and Meinong. Going beyond the 
metaontological debate, thorough treatment is given to novel topics 
in metametaphysics, including grounding, ontological dependence, 
fundamentality, modal epistemology, intuitions, thought experiments, 
and the relationship between metaphysics and science. The book will 
be an essential resource for those studying advanced metaphysics, 
philosophical methodology, metametaphysics, epistemology, and the 
philosophy of science. 
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 Preface 
 Metametaphysical issues, or methodological issues pertaining to 
 metaphysics, have been central in my work for about a decade. My disser-
tation was called  The Necessity of Metaphysics  – I have always been optimistic 
about our ability to overcome the many methodological challenges that 
metaphysical inquiry faces. Although my views regarding many specifi c 
questions have changed over the years, my general attitude towards meta-
metaphysics has remained largely unchanged: I still think that realism is 
worth defending, that modal epistemology is of particular methodological 
importance in metaphysics, and that we cannot do metaphysics without 
relying on at least some  a priori reasoning, whatever the correct account of 
the relationship between  a priori and  a posteriori turns out to be. 
 In recent years I have taught several courses in Helsinki on the topics of 
this book. There’s no doubt that preparing for these courses and discussing 
the material with my students has helped me to better articulate many of 
the central questions of metametaphysics. Much remains to be done before 
this young area reaches the conceptual clarity that one might desire, but 
I hope that this book goes at least some way towards this goal. 
 I would like to express my gratitude to the following people, who read 
and commented on the material of this book: Hanoch Ben-Yami, Francesco 
Berto, Matti Eklund, Guglielmo Feis, Marcello Oreste Fiocco, Joachim 
Horvath, Markku Keinänen, James Miller, Matteo Morganti, Donnchadh 
O’Conaill, Olley Pearson, Paavo Pylkkänen, and Anand Vaidya. Their val-
uable feedback saved me from many errors and omissions; any remain-
ing errors are my own. I  have discussed the material of this book with 
too many people to list here as well as presenting the papers related to 
the book at numerous seminars and conferences. I  appreciate the feed-
back received at these events. I would also like to thank Hilary Gaskin at 
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Cambridge University Press for support throughout the process of  writing 
this book, as well as an anonymous reader for helpful comments. My great-
est debt, however, will always be to my mentor and PhD supervisor, the 
late E. J. Lowe. In Jonathan’s work I fi rst discovered the metametaphysical 
attitude that continues to guide my work today. Finally, most of the work 
for this book has been made possible by various grants from the Academy 
of Finland. 
 I have drawn on the following previously published and forthcoming 
material, although it has been extensively reworked for the purposes of 
this book. In addition, some material in  Chapter 9 is based on joint ongoing 
work with Matteo Morganti. I’d like to thank him for the permission to use 
that material in this book. 
 ‘ A New Defi nition of  A Priori Knowledge: In Search of a Modal Basis ,’  Metaphysica 
 9 . 2 ( 2008 ), pp.  57 – 68 . 
 ‘ A Priori and  A Posteriori : A Bootstrapping Relationship ,’  Metaphysica  12 . 2 ( 2011 ), 
pp.  151 – 164 . 
 ‘ In Defence of Aristotelian Metaphysics, ’ in  T. E.  Tahko (ed.),  Contemporary 
Aristotelian Metaphysics ( Cambridge University Press ,  2012 ), pp.  26 – 43 . 
 ‘ Counterfactuals and Modal Epistemology ,’  Grazer Philosophische Studien  86 
( 2012 ), pp.  93 – 115 . 
 ‘ Boundaries in Reality ,’  Ratio  25 . 4 ( 2012 ), pp.  405 – 424 . 
 ‘ Truth-Grounding and Transitivity ,’  Thought: A Journal of Philosophy  2 . 4 ( 2013 ), pp. 
 332 – 340 . 
 ‘ Boring Infi nite Descent ,’  Metaphilosophy  45 . 2 ( 2014 ), pp.  257 – 269 . 
 ‘ Natural Kind Essentialism Revisited ,’  Mind 124.495 (2015), pp. 795–822. 
 ‘ Ontological Dependence ,’ in  E. N.  Zalta (ed.),  The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2015 edn); see  http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/
entries/dependence-ontological/ (with E. J. Lowe). 
 ‘ Empirically Informed Modal Rationalism ,’ in  R. W.  Fischer and  F.  Leon (eds.), 
 Modal Epistemology After Rationalism , Synthese Library ( Dordrecht :  Springer , 
forthcoming). 
 ‘ The Modal Status of Laws:  In Defence of a Hybrid View ,’  The Philosophical 
Quarterly ( forthcoming ), doi:10.1093/pq/pqv006. 
 ‘ Minimal Truthmakers ,’  Pacifi c Philosophical Quarterly ( forthcoming ), doi:10.1111/
papq.12064 (with Donnchadh O’Conaill.) 
1 1  Why should you care about 
metametaphysics? 
 This introductory chapter deals with the motivation for studying 
 metametaphysics and its importance for metaphysics more generally. The 
relationship between  metametaphysics and  metaontology is clarifi ed, some 
guidance for reading the book is given, and chapter outlines are provided. 
In addition, the chapter contains suggestions for further reading, divided 
between introductory material and more advanced material. 
 Since you’ve opened this book, it is probably safe to assume that you 
have an interest in metaphysics. Perhaps you think that metaphysics is an 
interesting area of philosophy and want to know more about it or maybe 
you’re a student or a professional philosopher specializing in metaphys-
ics. Alternatively, you might be suspicious of metaphysics and its value or 
contribution within philosophy (and outside it). Perhaps you think that 
metaphysics is not a substantial area of philosophy because it focuses on 
pseudo-problems or merely conceptual, linguistic disagreements. You may 
be coming to philosophy from another discipline, such as the natural sci-
ences, and you might be suspicious of the methods of philosophy, especially 
when compared with the rigour of your own discipline. Or perhaps you work 
in a different area of philosophy, wondering how on earth metaphysicians 
could possibly justify their outlandish claims about the structure of reality … 
 All of the above attitudes are  meta metaphysical attitudes. Just as with 
any kind of attitude, if you hold a metametaphysical attitude you ought 
to be able to justify  why it is that you hold it. The reason might be simply 
because you haven’t seen much discussion about what metaphysicians are 
really up to or of how they think they arrive at their various metaphysical 
positions. If that’s the case, you’ve opened the right book. If you’re inclined 
to be dismissive about the value of metaphysics or think that its methods 
are spurious because you have read all the great metaphysicians and found 
their work wanting in this regard, you’ve also opened the right book. In 
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contrast, if you consider metaphysics the heart of philosophy and can’t get 
enough of it, if you enjoy comparing different theories and judging their 
relative merits, then – you guessed it – you too have opened the right book. 
 The author of this book is a metaphysician working in the tradition that 
is usually called  analytic metaphysics. The analytic vs. continental distinc-
tion is not – the author feels – particularly helpful, but for want of a more 
descriptive account, it should be made clear that this book is focused on 
the analytic tradition. The author of this book also has a particular meta-
metaphysical attitude. This attitude is a type of  ontological realism , which 
we will look into in detail later in this book. But as a reader, you should be 
aware that the author is biased in favour of certain types of realist meta-
physics and towards the view that metaphysics does have both intrinsic 
value and an impact throughout philosophy and the sciences. This is not 
an uncommon attitude amongst metaphysicians, but it certainly requires 
justifi cation. However, this is not a research monograph defending a par-
ticular position, so space will be given to various positions. Metaphysicians 
are a defensive lot; they hold their metaphysical views dear and their  meta-
 metaphysical views perhaps even dearer, despite the fact that they don’t 
always explicitly express the latter. So you will notice that the present 
author sometimes takes a defensive attitude. Accordingly, this introduc-
tion to metametaphysics is ‘opinionated’ – someone with a more dismis-
sive attitude towards metaphysics would no doubt write a very different 
account. In any case, since it is still much too early to talk about a fully 
established set of metametaphysical views, despite certain clear patterns, 
anyone writing a book on metametaphysics has to make some diffi cult 
choices on how to lay out the various positions and indeed even what to  call 
them. Similarly, the precise area that a book on metametaphysics – intro-
ductory or otherwise – should cover is certainly open to debate. This book, 
if anything, errs on the side of covering too much, since at times the reader 
may feel that the discussion has turned to  fi rst-order metaphysics instead 
of the promised meta-analysis of metaphysics. This is largely because it is 
very diffi cult, impossible even, to discuss the various metametaphysical 
issues without resorting to a battery of examples of fi rst-order metaphys-
ical debates. 
 The reader will soon notice that there are two themes not obviously 
included under metametaphysics, but discussed extensively throughout 
this book. They are epistemology and (philosophy of) science. Although it 
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is true that these topics are not obviously metametaphysical in themselves, 
it would be diffi cult to avoid them altogether when discussing metameta-
physics. The reason for this is quite simple. A central, perhaps  the central 
question of metametaphysics is: How do we acquire metaphysical know-
ledge? Here is an alternative formulation of essentially the same ques-
tion: How does metaphysical inquiry work? These are very clearly  epistemic 
questions, having to do with metaphysical knowledge. Science and its phil-
osophy enter the picture very quickly after these initial questions, for one 
popular answering strategy to epistemic questions in metaphysics is that 
metaphysical knowledge and inquiry have something to do with  scientifi c 
knowledge or inquiry. Of course, not everyone would accept this answer 
and even if one does, diffi cult questions remain concerning the exact rela-
tionship between metaphysical and scientifi c knowledge. At any rate, most 
metaphysicians today would readily propose that there is either some sort 
of important parallelism or else some continuity between metaphysics and 
science. At the same time, metaphysics is also one of the last frontiers of 
philosophy where pure ‘armchair reasoning’ without any connection to 
experimental methods may seem a perfectly acceptable method of inquiry. 
So there is also a tension here, one that strongly divides opinions. Given all 
this, it is diffi cult to see how any book concerning metametaphysics could 
remain completely silent about epistemic or scientifi c matters – this one 
certainly doesn’t. 
 1.1  Metametaphysics or metaontology? 
 Most readers interested in metametaphysics are no doubt familiar with 
another, closely related term, namely  metaontology . The title of this book 
is a conscious choice: we can distinguish between metametaphysics and 
metaontology. The usage of these terms is not entirely standardized, but 
roughly put, it could be said that metametaphysics is the broader of the 
two terms. More precisely, metametaphysics encompasses metaontol-
ogy, but covers other issues as well. This type of distinction can also be 
made between metaphysics and ontology. The term ‘metaphysics’ has an 
Aristotelian origin:  according to the usual story, the ‘meta’ (‘beyond’, or 
‘after’) refers simply to the fact that in certain collected works of Aristotle 
some works appear  after his works concerning physics. So ‘metaphys-
ics’ does not really refer to the content of these works, but rather their 
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original relative locations. The term ‘ontology’, however, has a more 
content-oriented Aristotelian origin, as the Greek  ουτα (onta) refers to 
‘being’. So ontology is the study of being (or being  qua being – being as it 
is in itself, as Aristotle might add). Note however that Aristotle did not use 
these terms; they have been adopted later on. Ontology emerges as a some-
what more well-defi ned, albeit extremely general, area of study, whereas 
metaphysics is typically conceived as concerning reality or the  structure of 
reality, in an even more general sense. The distinction between metaphys-
ics and ontology is, however, vague at best, since many authors use the 
terms interchangeably. Accordingly, similar vagueness affects the distinc-
tion between metaontology and metametaphysics. 
 But what is metaontology? The fi rst systematic use of the term is usu-
ally credited to  Peter van Inwagen’s 1998 article of the same title. 1 In van 
Inwagen’s usage, the term ‘metaontology’ has Quinean connotations. 
Quine considered the central question of ontology to be ‘What is there?’ – 
something that we will discuss in  Chapter 2 . But van Inwagen points out 
that if we wish to consider what it is that we are asking when we say ‘What 
is there?’, this seems to go beyond ontological questions, hence  meta ontol-
ogy. Van Inwagen defi nes a fairly strict sense of the term: metaontology in 
Quine’s sense concerns quantifi cation and ontological commitment (these 
will be discussed in more detail in  Chapter 3 ). This turns out to be a fairly 
narrow understanding of metaontology, but note that on this defi nition 
the metaontological question could be different for someone other than 
Quine , who might think differently of the task of  ontology . In any case, 
largely because of this original usage of the term, metaontology is typically 
understood in this relatively narrow sense. In passing, we might note that 
one alternative understanding of the task of ontology, perhaps closer to 
the Aristotelian line, would be to give a central position to so-called ‘formal 
ontology’. This term of art does not refer to ontology conducted with for-
mal methods (although it could involve formal methods); rather, it refers to 
the study of  ontological form , which involves the structures and relations in 
which ontological elements (such as objects) stand. 2 More generally, ontol-
ogy understood in this fashion involves an examination of the categorical 
 1  Peter  van Inwagen , ‘ Metaontology ,’  Erkenntnis  48 ( 1998 ), pp.  233 – 250 . 
 2  The terminology has Husserlian origins, see  Barry  Smith and  Kevin  Mulligan , 
‘ Framework for Formal Ontology ,’  Topoi  3 ( 1983 ), pp.  73 – 85 . 
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structure of reality – a task which goes back to Aristotle’s  Categories . One 
contemporary example of the systematic study of ontological categories in 
this sense is E. J. Lowe ’s  four-category ontology . 3 Hence, it is not diffi cult to 
see that ‘metaontology’ understood from this point of view could amount 
to something quite different than when understood from the Quinean 
point of view. Partly for this reason, the title of this book contains the 
broader term, namely ‘metametaphysics’, for we wish to account for  both 
of these views. 
 One source of confusion regarding the term ‘metametaphysics’ may 
derive from the fact that the best-known work containing the word in 
its title  – the 2009  Metametaphysics anthology edited by David Chalmers , 
David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman – is by and large focused on the pro-
ject of metaontology as van Inwagen defi nes it (with some exceptions). 4 
Indeed, the subtitle of the anthology is ‘New Essays on the Foundations 
of Ontology’. In fact, the terms ‘metaontology’ and ‘metametaphysics’ are 
also often used interchangeably. But let us attempt to defi ne the term ‘met-
ametaphysics’ as it is used in this book. 
 Metametaphysics = df The study of the foundations and methodology of 
metaphysics. 
 Here, ‘metaphysics’ is understood to encompass ontology, so metameta-
physics will also involve the study of the foundations and methodology of 
ontology. Accordingly, metaontology is to be understood as a subspecies of 
metametaphysics.  Chapters 2 and  3 , and to some extent  Chapter 4 , could 
roughly speaking be said to concern metaontology in van Inwagen’s sense, 
although they do not do so exclusively. Subsequent chapters ( Chapters 5 
to   9 ) concern the methodology of metaphysics in a much broader sense; 
they also involve a great deal of epistemology. However, the reader is 
advised to not put too much weight on these distinctions, as they are 
indeed vague . The guiding thought in this book is to be inclusive and the 
suggested defi nition of metametaphysics certainly allows this. Both terms, 
‘metaontology’ and ‘metametaphysics’, are used in this book, roughly in 
the sense suggested here; that is, metaontology refers primarily to the 
 3  E. J.  Lowe ,  The Four-Category Ontology:  A  Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science 
( Oxford :  Clarendon Press ,  2006 ) . 
 4  D.  Chalmers ,  D.  Manley , and  R.  Wasserman (eds.),  Metametaphysics ( Oxford University 
Press ,  2009 ) . 
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study of existence , quantifi cation , and ontological commitment , whereas 
metametaphysics encompasses these areas and also broader issues in the 
methodology of metaphysics. 
 1.2  How to read this book 
 This book is aimed at relatively advanced undergraduate and graduate 
students with at least some prior knowledge of metaphysics and related 
fi elds. However, being the fi rst of its kind, it will also prove helpful to 
 professionals working for example on metaphysics, epistemology, or phil-
osophy of science. While some prior knowledge of metaphysics is assumed, 
prior knowledge of  meta metaphysics is not necessary. An introductory 
course in metaphysics ought to be suffi cient to follow the book, at least if 
the reader supplements this book with some of the further material ref-
erenced within it. The recommended background is an advanced course 
in metaphysics and basic knowledge of philosophical logic, although for-
malism is kept to a minimum. It should perhaps be emphasized that the 
reader is certainly advised to read some of the primary material referred 
to in the book, for it is impossible to do justice to all the topics that we 
will cover. Partly for this reason, a fairly extensive bibliography for an 
introductory book is provided. Emphasis is given to some of the most 
recent literature in metametaphysics, with the hope that even experts 
in the fi eld may fi nd the book useful. The book also includes a glossary 
with short defi nitions of some of the most important technical terms. The 
glossary is not exhaustive and the reader is also advised to consult the 
index for the full context of each term, but the glossary can be used as a 
quick reminder. 
 There are no particularly important guidelines regarding the process of 
reading this book. The book has been written with the assumption that 
most readers will proceed from the beginning to the end and this is indeed 
the advisable order for those not very familiar with the topics of the book, 
but each chapter can certainly be read on its own. Typically, when some 
prior knowledge of relevant concepts, views, or tools is assumed, this is 
indicated in the text, with reference to the chapter where the concept/
view/tool was fi rst introduced. More advanced readers should have no 
trouble jumping ahead to topics that interest them. If the book is used for 
a course in metametaphysics, the teacher may decide to pick individual 
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chapters to supplement other material. The same can of course be done 
with a normal metaphysics course, as many introductory courses in met-
aphysics now contain lessons on the methodology and foundations of 
metaphysics. 
 One aspect worth mentioning here is the number of examples from the 
sciences that the reader of this book will encounter. In many cases, certain 
metaphysical positions are illustrated with examples from the natural sci-
ences, physics and chemistry in particular. It is assumed that most readers 
will have some familiarity with many of the examples from previous meta-
physics or philosophy of science courses, but they are generally laid out in 
such a way that no prior knowledge is necessary. There are a few excep-
tions, though. For instance, certain examples from fundamental physics 
may be diffi cult to understand without any prior knowledge of physics, 
even though they are not presented formally. However, in these cases, the 
reader will not miss anything absolutely crucial if they decide to skip the 
more detailed examples. 
 A fi nal note on the system of referencing used. Full bibliographical detail 
is provided in footnotes and also in the fi nal bibliography. In each chapter, 
the fi rst reference includes the full bibliographical detail; later instances 
use the short-title system. 
 1.3  Chapter outlines 
 A brief outline of each chapter is provided below. The purpose of these 
outlines is to give the reader a general idea of the topics discussed in each 
chapter. Note however that technical terms and various ‘isms’ are not 
defi ned in the outlines, so the reader should not be too concerned about 
being able to understand the relevant views  – that’s what the chapters 
themselves are for. Although each chapter can be read on its own, some of 
them are thematically connected. This is the case especially with  Chapters 2 
and  3 , and partly also  Chapter 4 . These three chapters focus on metaontol-
ogy as it was defi ned earlier, although no particular attempt is made to 
stay strictly within metaontology.  Chapters 5 and  6 are somewhat techni-
cal, as they introduce the metaphysician’s ‘toolbox’ – concepts and tools of 
formal ontology that are used in metaphysics and metametaphysics. Both 
chapters also apply these tools.  Chapters 7 and  8 turn to epistemic mat-
ters, discussing the methods of metaphysical inquiry.  Chapter 9 concludes 
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the book with a discussion of the relationship between  metaphysics and 
science, taking advantage of much of the material of the earlier chapters. 
 Chapter 2: Quine vs. Carnap: on what there is and 
what there isn’t 
 The historical origins of metametaphysics are typically traced back to the 
debate between W. V. Quine and Rudolf Carnap in the 1940s and 1950s. In 
this chapter, an overview of that debate will be given, but the historical 
details and the original context of the debate will not be the main subject. 
One central topic is the status of existence questions such as ‘Do numbers 
exist?’ Are such questions substantial or merely conceptual, to be settled 
by linguistics rather than genuine metaphysics? Carnap was famously scep-
tical about the metaphysical import of such questions, arguing that there 
is nothing substantial at stake when we ask such questions. The result-
ing view is a type of  language pluralism , according to which we can choose 
our ontological framework  – our preferred language  – liberally. Alexius 
Meinong ’s views on the matter and the problem of ‘Plato ’s beard’ – dealing 
with non-existence – will also be discussed. Carnap ’s distinction between 
internal and external questions is outlined and some of its modern applica-
tions discussed. 
 Chapter 3: Quantifi cation and ontological commitment 
 This chapter continues to discuss existence questions, but the focus shifts 
towards quantifi cation : the status and meaning of the existential quantifi er, 
including its history and name, are discussed. In particular, the question of 
the Quinean criterion of ontological commitment , according to which we 
are ontologically committed to those entities that we quantify over, is criti-
cally examined, also with reference to its modern counterparts. Moreover, 
the possibility of so-called ‘quantifi er variance ’ is discussed, as defended 
by Eli Hirsch and opposed by Ted Sider , among others. Quantifi er variance 
is the thesis that there is no single (best) quantifi er meaning. The thesis is 
closely related to Hirsch’s view that ontological debates concerning physi-
cal objects are ‘merely verbal’. Finally, Kit Fine ’s alternative metaontologi-
cal position, which attempts to undermine the importance of existence 
questions, is discussed. 
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 Chapter 4: Identifying the alternatives: ontological realism, 
defl ationism, and conventionalism 
 This chapter surveys various metametaphysical positions, some of which 
have already been discussed in previous chapters. The main contenders 
are ontological realism , ontological anti-realism , defl ationism , and con-
ventionalism . It will become clear that some terminological clarifi cation is 
needed in order to correctly identify the various subspecies of these views. 
The debate concerning quantifi er variance between Hirsch and Sider will 
be discussed again, but from a slightly different point of view. Sider’s ver-
sion of ontological realism will receive further attention and is considered 
as a case study, with reference to an example from physics. 
 Chapter 5: Grounding and ontological dependence 
 It is time to introduce some further metaphysical tools:  grounding and 
ontological dependence. The notion of ‘ground’ stormed into contempor-
ary analytic metaphysics at the beginning of the twenty-fi rst century, but 
the roots of the notion go all the way to Aristotle . At its simplest, ground-
ing may be understood as ‘metaphysical explanation’. To be more precise, 
when some  x is grounded in some  y , it is usually thought that  y explains  x . 
On the face of it, grounding expresses a relation of ontological depend-
ence. Ontological dependence is a family of relations and different ver-
sions of dependence will be discussed in some detail. The question whether 
grounding is indeed a version of ontological dependence or not will also be 
examined. The formal features of ground and some related notions as well 
as applications are outlined. These include causation , reduction , modality, 
and truthmaking . 
 Chapter 6: Fundamentality and levels of reality 
 This chapter concerns the view that reality comes with a hierarchical struc-
ture of ‘levels’ . This type of view has a long history and it remains very 
popular. Our everyday experiences as well as scientifi c practice seem to 
strongly support such a view, since  scale is a major factor in both of them. 
Usually, the reference to scale becomes apparent when talking about parts 
and wholes  – which are studied in  mereology :  we talk about subatomic 
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particles constituting atoms, atoms constituting molecules, and molecules 
constituting everything we see around us. We can express this in terms of 
ontological dependence, which is covered in  Chapter 5 : the wholes depend 
for their existence on their parts. Fundamentality comes in when we ask 
whether there is an end or a beginning to this hierarchical structure, or 
equivalently to the relevant chain of dependence. Much of the discussion 
in this chapter will concern the analysis of ‘metaphysical foundationalism’, 
which states that there is an end to the chain of dependence, and ‘meta-
physical infi nitism’ , which states that chains of dependence can continue 
infi nitely. These views are also discussed with reference to physics. 
 Chapter 7: The epistemology of metaphysics:  a priori or  a posteriori ? 
 The epistemology of metaphysics, which is the topic of this chapter, is a 
broad area. The discussion starts from the  a priori vs .  a posteriori distinction, 
which turns out to be more controversial than one might have thought. 
Various options to clarify the distinction are considered. The bulk of the 
chapter deals with modal epistemology: our knowledge of possibility and 
necessity. This will be our case study of the epistemology of metaphysics. 
Much of metaphysical knowledge seems to involve modal elements, so we 
need an account of how we are able to acquire modal knowledge. The two 
main competitors here are ‘modal rationalism ’ and ‘modal empiricism’. 
At fi rst glance, they seem to refl ect the  a priori vs.  a posteriori distinction 
regarding the source of modal knowledge, but the situation is more com-
plicated than that, as ‘pure’  a priori or  a posteriori knowledge appears to be 
scarce. Therefore, a view according to which both types of knowledge are 
needed becomes somewhat attractive. Such a view and its prospects are 
studied. 
 Chapter 8: Intuitions and thought experiments in metaphysics 
 This chapter continues on epistemic themes. Intuitions and thought exper-
iments are considered important sources of metaphysical knowledge, but 
there is much controversy surrounding them:  how reliable are they as 
sources of evidence? One problem is that often it is not clear what is even 
meant by ‘intuition’. This chapter examines a variety of ways to under-
stand metaphysical intuitions and their role in metaphysical inquiry. These 
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include ‘rational intuitions’, which are typically associated with  a priori 
faculties, and experience-based intuitions. The chapter also discusses the 
relationship between thought experiments and intuitions as well as the 
differences and similarities between philosophical and scientifi c thought 
experiments. 
 Chapter 9: Demarcating metaphysics and science: 
can metaphysics be naturalized? 
 This chapter concerns the relationship between science and metaphysics. 
There are a variety of options in this regard. One of them is that metaphys-
ics is autonomous and able to tell us something about the world on its 
own, despite the complications introduced by, say, modern physics. On this 
view, metaphysical inquiry into the fundamental structure of reality can 
uphold scientifi c realism. Another option is at the other extreme: fully ‘nat-
uralistic’ metaphysics. According to this view, metaphysics cannot hope 
to say anything about reality independently of science. There are also less 
extreme versions of this view. One such version is due to James Ladyman 
and Don Ross ; the view can be outlined by discussing two principles: the 
 Principle of Naturalistic Closure and the  Primacy of Physics . The upshot of these 
principles is that metaphysics has a role to play, but it is severely limited, 
primarily unifi catory. The possibility of building a methodological bridge 
between science and metaphysics is also examined: even if the  subject mat-
ter of the two disciplines is distinct, perhaps there are some similarities in 
their  method ? Finally, a more modest, reconciliatory view of the relation-
ship between science and metaphysics will be proposed: ‘moderately natu-
ralistic metaphysics’. 
 1.4  Further reading 
 Although at the time of writing this is the only textbook dedicated to 
metametaphysics, there are certainly important discussions of meta-
metaphysics, metaontology , and the methodology of metaphysics in 
various textbooks and collections of papers. Themes relevant to meta-
metaphysics are also discussed, sometimes extensively, in books dealing 
with philosophical methodology or metaphilosophy more generally. The 
following is a list of such material that, while far from complete, may 
Why should you care about metametaphysics?12 
prove useful to the reader of this book. The material is divided between 
introductory and more advanced material. Here the focus is exclusively 
on books, but the reader is encouraged to browse the fi nal bibliography 
for further material. 
 Introductory material 
 Francesco  Berto and  Matteo  Plebani ,  Ontology and Metaontology: A Contemporary 
Guide ( London :  Bloomsbury ,  2015 ). 
 Chris  Daly ,  Introduction to Philosophical Methods ( Peterborough, ON :  Broadview 
Press ,  2010 ). 
 Alyssa  Ney ,  Metaphysics: An Introduction ( Abingdon :  Routledge ,  2014 ). 
 S.  Overgaard ,  P.  Gilbert , and  S.  Burwood ,  An Introduction to Metaphilosophy 
( Cambridge University Press ,  2013 ). 
 David  Papineau ,  Philosophical Devices:  Proofs, Probabilities, Possibilities, and Sets 
( Oxford University Press ,  2012 ). 
 More advanced material 
 A. R.  Booth and  D. P.  Rowbottom (eds.),  Intuitions ( Oxford University Press ,  2014 ). 
 Albert  Casullo and  J. C.  Thurow (eds.),  The  A Priori in Philosophy ( Oxford University 
Press ,  2013 ). 
 D.  Chalmers ,  D.  Manley , and  R.  Wasserman (eds.),  Metametaphysics ( Oxford 
University Press ,  2009 ). 
 Fabrice  Correia and  Benjamin  Schnieder (eds.),  Metaphysical Grounding: 
Understanding the Structure of Reality ( Cambridge University Press ,  2012 ). 
 R. W.  Fischer and  Felipe  Leon (eds.),  Modal Epistemology After Rationalism , Synthese 
Library ( Dordrecht :  Springer ,  forthcoming ). 
 Matthew C.  Haug (ed.),  Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory? 
( Abingdon :  Routledge ,  2014 ). 
 Matteo  Morganti ,  Combining Science and Metaphysics ( New York :  Palgrave Macmillan , 
 2013 ). 
 T. E.  Tahko (ed.),  Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics ( Cambridge University 
Press ,  2012 ). 
 Timothy  Williamson ,  The Philosophy of Philosophy ( Oxford :   Blackwell Publishing , 
 2007 ). 
